The Law Commission has published its final report on aggravated, exemplary and restitutionary damages, the most important recommendation of which is an expansion of the availability of exemplary damages. 
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It is surely right to distinguish firmly between compensation and punishment. But the Report's analysis of aggravated damages is a little hasty. Aggravated damages are traditionally awarded in cases where the mental distress in question is outrage or indignation resulting from the cynical, flagrant or insulting nature of the defendant's wrong. 6 In other words the "mental distress" in issue is really the emotional concomitant of a moral attitude of condemnation. This is why aggravated damages have traditionally been associated with exemplary damages, because in such cases punishment of the defendant may well also be called for (assuming that the outrage and indignation are justified). The only feasible way to assuage feelings of outrage or indignation is through punishment duly administered. Punishment is, after all, at least partly explained as the public expression of the indignation and outrage of the community as a whole, in sympathy with and on behalf of the victim. 7 An attempt to compensate the victim by a money payment for such feelings without condemnation of the wrongdoer is misguided and is any case unlikely to be satisfactory to the victim. It would be better to abandon the idea of compensating for this form of "mental distress" and concentrate on ensuring that the means are always available for imposing punishment where it is appropriate, by exemplary damages if necessary.
8
This is not of course to deny the legitimacy or the importance of compensating for 6 Paras 2.1-2.3, 2.18. 7 See below, at nn9-10. 8 The Report casts doubt on the decision of the Court of Appeal in AB v South West Water Services
[1993] QB 507 not to award aggravated damages for indignation: paras 2.32, 2.36.
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other forms of mental distress in appropriate cases. 9 Neither does it mean that punishment should be tailored to satisfy the demands of the victim.
Exemplary damages

Punishment in civil proceedings
The Report accepts that exemplary damages are punitive, but there is surprisingly
little discussion of what punishment is, or how it is to be distinguished from other legal responses, or how punishment is related to crime or to the fundamental division between civil and criminal law; and yet it is surely clear that these issues must be relevant to the law on exemplary or punitive damages. Punishment consists of a constraint or harm imposed by the authority of the state in consequence of a breach of a duty imposed by law. But, furthermore, what distinguishes punishment from a remedy like compensation or an injunction arising from a breach of duty (which also involves the imposition of a constraint or harm on the defendant) is the purpose and intended effect of the imposition. For punishment, it is (to put it in general terms) to uphold the community interest in compliance with the duty in question, 10 whereas for a remedy it is the protection of the private interest of the particular plaintiff in the performance of the duty owed to him.
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The purpose for which the response is made determines the circumstances in which it is justified and the procedure that should be required as a prerequisite. In the case of a 5 claim for a remedy, the procedural and evidential rules should reflect the fact that the plaintiff and defendant are on a more or less equal footing, the plaintiff's interest in a remedy (if his claim is right) competing with the defendant's comparable interest in being free from liability for the remedy (if the plaintiff's claim is unjustified). By contrast, in the case of punishment the proceedings are not a contest between two parties on an equal footing but a trial of the defendant in which his guilt and the community's interest in punishment are at issue. The injustice to the defendant of mistaken punishment greatly exceeds the injustice of a mistaken acquittal. Thus there is every reason to adopt a procedure and evidential rules weighted in the defendant's favour which give him additional safeguards against an unjust outcome. 12 In addition the imposition of punishment is generally taken (at least for less minor cases) to require that the defendant have committed the breach of duty intentionally (in the sense this is given under the doctrine of mens rea).
It follows from this approach that what distinguishes criminal and civil law is not the nature of the duty breached but the nature of the response to the breach (and the requirement that the breach be intentional in the case of a punitive response). Thus in principle one should not speak, say, of two duties not to assault, one in criminal law and one in civil law, but one duty not to assault, the breach of which gives rise to two different types of legal response, according to whether it is the victim who is seeking a remedy or the community seeking to punish. The duty itself is a prescription for This is only acceptable, however, if it is possible to install appropriate safeguards for the defendant in respect of the punishment. It may not be necessary for him to have the same degree of protection as he would have in the case of serious offences leading to imprisonment, but it is surely inconceivable that the defendant's interest in not being wrongly punished could ever be thought so unimportant that the balance of probabilities would be appropriate as the standard of proof. There are other problems with punishment in civil proceedings. If the punishment is in the form of money paid to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will receive a supra-compensatory payment or windfall.
Furthermore the wrong may have a number of victims, so that the difficulty arises of who is to receive the windfall payment and how it is to be allocated. And if the punishment is made through civil proceedings controlled by the plaintiff, it is open to the parties to compromise the proceedings, whereas criminal proceedings are as a rule 8 not open to compromise. 15 Since punishment is imposed in the public interest, compromise of proceedings with the victim, although it may be in the interests of the victim, may not always be in the public interest and may mean that the law is inadequately enforced. The same objection does not apply to negotiation and settlement or waiver over a remedy, whose purpose is only to protect the private interest of the plaintiff. 16 Also there is the need to ensure co-ordination with criminal proceedings for the same wrong to avoid double punishment or double jeopardy.
These difficulties suggest that punitive damages should be an exceptional response, or at least that they should not be the normal form of punishment for serious wrongs and possibly wrongs that cause harm to several parties.
The Report's approach to punitive damages
The Report points out that the common law world seems to have divided into two approaches on punitive damages. 17 The first approach, which underlies the current English law, is that punitive damages are never appropriate in civil proceedings. This was the view of the majority in the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard. However, out of deference to existing case law, the House accepted that punitive damages should continue to be available in certain cases. This left the law in an awkward state;
in particular the House seems to have adopted the extraordinary "cause of action rule" according to which the availability of punitive damages depends on whether punitive 9 damages had been imposed in respect of such a cause of action before Rookes v Barnard was decided. 18 The underlying view that punitive damages are never appropriate in civil proceedings reflects the recognition of the desirability of segregating punishment and remedies, for the reasons considered above, in particular the need for special safeguards that are available only in criminal proceedings, even at the expense of accepting that there will be an inadequate legal response in some circumstances. The second approach is that a deliberate breach of duty that comes before a court in civil proceedings should as a rule be punished by way of punitive damages. This approach seems to have prevailed in the other common law jurisdictions, including Australia, New Zealand and the United States. 19 It reflects the desirability of the full legal response at the expense of a strict segregation of remedies and punishment. The problem with this approach is that it may fail to address the difficulties mentioned above that have led to segregation, including the need for additional safeguards in the case of punishment.
The Report is broadly in favour of English law moving to the second approach, according to which punitive damages should be generally available in civil proceedings. 20 However, there is some confusion over the reasons for this. 24 The Report also considers the objection that the plaintiff receives a windfall. 25 It is undesirable that a windfall should be received through the operation of the law, but it is no doubt less objectionable than a failure to punish where punishment is due. There are particular difficulties where there are multiple victims of a wrong, and the Report's "first past the post" proposal for giving all the punitive damages to the first successful plaintiff is likely to make the law look capricious. The problem of compromise is not considered in the Report at all, although punitive damages clearly raise the issue because civil proceedings can be settled. The Report assumes that such compromise over punitive damages is to be encouraged, but as mentioned above this is at least open to argument.
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It is important that the legal system should be able to offer the full legal response as defined above, and it is also important that the procedure to which the parties are subject should be adapted to the response in question. The segregation of punishment and remedy through the division between criminal and civil proceedings is for most purposes the best way to achieve this. But there is room for other arrangements. A limited role for compensation orders in criminal trials is well established. 27 Punitive damages in civil proceedings can play a part also but they suffer the disadvantages mentioned above. Maybe there is room for developing other arrangements, like cooperative proceedings involving the Crown and a civil plaintiff, or powers of the Crown to take punitive action through the civil courts, 28 in relation to matters that the civil courts are expert in, and subject to appropriate safeguards. But for the moment the Report may be right that punitive damages should be generally available, although in my view it gives insufficient weight to the need for appropriate safeguards for the defendant.
Breach of contract
Breach of contract needs special consideration. 31 It would be closer to the truth to say that the absence of punitive damages is related to the absence of certainty in contract: this is consistent with the reliance theory explanation in the next paragraph.
32 One possible reason not discussed is that, in accordance with the harm principle, it is wrong for the law to go further than protecting against harm and so should not punish a breach of duty unless the efficient breach, which is controversial even amongst adherents of law and economics.
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But there is a good reason why the non-performance of a contract should not generally attract punishment. This is that contract law does not generally create duties of performance. It is usually understood to create duties of performance because an agreement is understood as an exchange of promises, and a promise creates a duty.
Instead an agreement should be understood as involving the acceptance of responsibility for the other party's reliance on the assumption that the performance specified in the agreement will be carried out. 34 Such an interpretation implies that a contracting party does not have a duty to perform except in the special case where the payment of damages cannot reasonably compensate the other party for his reliance (consistently with the rule on specific performance, which should be available where there is a duty to perform.) Thus punitive damages should be available for breach of contract when the defendant failed to perform knowing that the plaintiff would in consequence suffer uncompensable loss. This is consistent with the approach of Mosk J in the recent Californian case of Freeman & Mills v Belcher. 35 He said that punitive damages should be available where "a party intentionally breaches a contractual duty is to avoid harm rather than to confer a benefit: see J Raz, "Promises in Morality and Law" (1982) 95 Harv LR 916. 15 obligation with neither probable cause nor belief that the obligation does not exist and when the party intends or knows that the breach will result in severe consequential damages to the other party that are not readily subject to mitigation, and such harm in fact occurs". 36 This is liable to be the case where the plaintiff has become dependent on the defendant by putting himself, through entering the contract, in a position in which, in order to avoid loss on the contract, he needs performance that can only be supplied by the defendant. In such circumstances the defendant's responsibility for the plaintiff's reliance interest generates a duty to perform and the deliberate breach of the duty justifies punitive damages.
Vicarious liability
Vicarious liability is ostensibly difficult to justify even in relation to compensation, because it seems to involve liability, ostensibly in respect of a wrong, but imposed on a party who did not commit it. The best justification seems to be that it is not liability for a wrong at all, but a form of strict liability for losses caused by a business designed to ensure that the business cannot profit without also bearing responsibility for the losses involved in the profit-making activity, whether incurred by the business itself or by outsiders through the activities of the business. 37 The Report seems to take the view that this argument also justifies vicarious liability for punitive damages, 38 but this is clearly not the case, because punitive damages do not represent any loss caused by the business.
36 Italics in original. The majority of the court held that punitive damages were never justified for breach of contract. 37 For an argument on these lines, see Jane Stapledon, Product Liability (Butterworths, 1994), 185ff.
38 Para 5.87ff.
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It is also argued in the Report that vicarious liability for punitive damages is justified because of its deterrent effect on employers, 39 in the form of the measures they will be induced to take to ensure that their employees are properly selected and trained and that decisions are properly taken with due consideration of the interests of outsiders.
No doubt such "vicarious punishment" can have this effect, although the effect on the conduct of the employer would be maximised if its imposition depended on the conduct of the employer, and then of course the punishment would not be vicarious at all. In any case, vicarious punishment is objectionable because of its unfairness, certainly in relation to more serious offences. The argument for vicarious punishment equally supports the general use of group punishment and the abandonment of mens rea. The real issue here is the general problem of corporate criminal responsibilityhow to deal with dangerous practices and procedures in companies or other organisations for which it is difficult to determine individual culpability, or for which no single individual is responsible.
Restitutionary damages
By restitutionary damages, the Report means, consistently with common usage, a response consisting of a pecuniary liability measured by the defendant's gain.
Sometimes restitutionary damages are regarded as "quasi-punitive". On this approach it is the public interest that justifies stripping the defendant of his profit according to the principle that a wrongdoer should not be permitted to profit from his wrong, whether this principle is understood as designed to remove the incentive to profit, or 39 Para 5.92. to deny the wrongdoer a benefit that it would be intrinsically wrong for him to keep.
Restitutionary damages on this understanding might be more aptly described as disgorgement. 40 Disgorgement is the civil law equivalent of confiscation, just as punitive damages are the equivalent of a fine. Disgorgement (and confiscation) might appear to be unnecessary if punishment were always available, on the basis that due punishment would always negate the wrongdoer's benefit. But it may be that it is right to remove the benefit of a wrong even in circumstances in which it would not be appropriate to punish, maybe where the wrong was inadvertent. In some cases, 45 Also an imputed licence fee, unlike the measure of disgorgement, would normally fall short of the benefit received.
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given that the distinction finds no place in the leading books on restitution. 46 It is generally said both that the purpose of restitutionary damages is to prevent a defendant from profiting from his wrong, and also that "restitution for wrongs", to which restitutionary damages are the response, is properly subsumed (with restitution for unjust enrichment by subtraction) under the single formula of "unjust enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff", which is understood to generate a normal civil claim in respect of an interest of the plaintiff. Thus the Report does not consider in connection with restitutionary damages any of the procedural difficulties that it accepts are relevant to punitive damages. But, where restitutionary damages are to be equated with disgorgement as understood above, these issues do need to be considered, as Halifax v Thomas showed.
Conclusion
The Report distinguishes firmly between exemplary damages as a form of punishment and aggravated damages as a form of compensation. It is open to doubt, however, whether aggravated damages can be adequately dealt with by assimilating them to the law on compensation for mental distress, as the Report suggests. The most important recommendation is for the expansion of the availability of exemplary or punitive damages. The recommendation is defensible, but the Report's analysis is unconvincing, and the issue needs to be considered as part of a wider assessment of the relation between civil and criminal law and the function of the division between 46 It was pointed out in Peter Jaffey, above n11. See also Daniel Friedmann, "Restitution of Benefits
Obtained through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong" 80 Colum LR 504 (1980) .
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the two. The Report's approach to restitutionary damages is flawed by its failure to distinguish between the quasi-punitive liability for disgorgement and the liability for reasonable payment for the unauthorised use of property. Given the longstanding controversy surrounding the area, the Report's recommendations are unlikely to attract universal approval; nevertheless, whether or not the Report leads to legislation, the Law Commission has certainly made a valuable contribution to the much-needed clarification and development of an important area of law.
